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I. BRITISH POLICY AND THE NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL
COUNCIL OF LIBYA1
A. Introduction
In February 2011,2 an uprising began in Benghazi in eastern Libya against the long-
established Gaddaﬁ3 Government. After initial military success by the rebels in the east,
the government responded forcefully. In the light of threats made by the government to
the lives of people in Benghazi, the Security Council authorized ‘any necessary
measures’ to protect civilian lives in Libya and to enforce a no-ﬂy zone over Libya’s air
space.4 Acting on this authorization, NATO forces intervened to enforce the no-ﬂy zone
and to protect civilians. The resolution precluded the occupation of Libya, so the NATO
action was conﬁned to aerial and some naval bombardment of regime targets in Libya.
The combined eﬀects of operations by the irregular forces of the rebels and the bombing
by NATO eventually led to the defeat of Government forces and the death of President
Gaddaﬁ on 20 October 2011. However, the overthrow of the regime was principally the
work of groups in the west and south-west, not formally associated with the original
insurrection in the east. This note is not concerned with matters of legality of the use of
force or the way in which the campaign was conducted by any of the participants.5 It
deals with the diplomatic aspects of the development of relations between the United
1 There is much which is tentative about this note. This reﬂects the still unresolved conclusion
of events in Libya and the surprising resort to the recognition of governments power by the British
government to deal with the unfolding situation there. I am very grateful to Roger Masterman of the
Durham Law School for discussions about aspects of this paper. He has saved me from error but is
not implicated in any which remain.
2 The ‘National Transitional Council’, which is a key institution in this story, was founded on
27 February 2011.
3 I have used the most usual transliteration ‘Gaddaﬁ’ for the name of the former president of
Libya. Some of the documents quoted in the note used a diﬀerent form.
4 Security Council resolution 1973, paras 4 and 8.
5 See Security Council resolution 2016 paras 5 and 6; NATO statement by Secetary-General,
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_80052.htm?mode=pressrelease> ; C Henderson, ‘In-
ternational Measures For The Protection Of Civilians In Libya And Côte D’ivoire’ (2011) 60 ICLQ
767.
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Kingdom, the Gaddaﬁ Government of Libya and the ‘National Transitional Council’
(NTC). It raises some speculation about the implications in domestic law of the way
British policy was conducted.
During the conﬂict, various States and international organizations had had dealings
with the rebels (and had modiﬁed their relations with the Gaddaﬁ Government), using
various terms to describe the NTC, the interim body representing the rebels.6 Before the
conﬂict started, the UK and Libya had ordinary, inter-State diplomatic relations, each
recognizing the other’s Government and maintaining an embassy in the other’s capital.7
After the rebellion began, the UK implemented the sanctions provisions of Security
Council resolution 19708 and took part in the armed operations within NATO under the
authorization in resolution 1973. The earliest acknowledgement of the status of the NTC
by the British government was that the NTC was regarded by the UK as the ‘legitimate
political interlocutor’ for the Libyan people.9 Later events took an unanticipated turn in
July 2011, when against its well-established policy, the British Government recognized
the NTC as the Government of Libya.10 It is this decision which is the principal focus of
this note.
In the previous Current Developments section, Professor Stefan Talmon dealt with
the early developments about the status of the authorities in Libya after the disturbances
there had commenced and after the Security Council had authorized action against the
Gaddaﬁ Government.11 He supplemented this in a later article which examined the
reactions of various States to the events, pointing out the diversity of responses that
there had been and indicating how diﬃcult the matter was for those States which had
adopted a policy of not recognizing governments, among them the British
Government.12 He did not anticipate, few could have done, that the British
Government would soon abandon its frequently reiterated policy and expressly
recognize the National Transitional Council as the Government of Libya. This note
sets out the UK practice which led up to that decision and the consequences of it. There
were uncertainties about the international legality of some aspects of the policies
adopted by States, a point taken by the Gaddaﬁ Government itself about the British
decision to recognize the NTC as the Government of Libya.13 In addition, the
government’s decision raises matters of domestic public law, which bear consideration,
even if the resolution of their diﬃculties is elusive. Just as it was impossible to foresee
that there would be a recognition decision, one cannot know whether the recognition of
the NTC was a single, ad hoc deviation from the established policy or whether it will be
a device used more frequently in future when a British Government is faced with the
6 S Talmon, ‘De-recognition of Colonel Qadhaﬁ as Head of State of Libya?’ (2011) 60 ICLQ
759.
7 The constitutional ad hockery of the arrangement under gaddaﬁ was extraordinary. Despite
the local nomenclatures, I shall refer to the administration as ‘Government’, its legation in London
as its ‘embassy’ and its senior representatives there as ‘ambassador’ or ‘chargé d’aﬀaires’,
whichever was appropriate at the time.
8 For the original implementation regime in the UK, see UK note to the Chair of the Sanctions
Committee under res 1970, paras 9–13, S/AC.52/2011/7, 17 June 2011 (which was modiﬁed as
later resolutions required).
9 <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news> , 19 April 2011, Foreign Secretary.
10 See below, Section E. 11 Talmon (n 6).
12 Talmon, ASIL Insights, Recognition of the Libyan Transitional Council, 15/16, 16 June
2011 <http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110616.pdf> . 13 See below, Section I.
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awkward choices which internal conﬂicts within another State often present to other
States not directly engaged in the ﬁghting.
B. Existing relations between the UK and Libya
Before the uprising began, the Gaddaﬁ Government was the sole authority in Libya with
which the British Government had inter-governmental relations and President Gaddaﬁ
was regarded as the Head of State of Libya, whatever peculiarities attended his position
in Libyan domestic law. There was a Libyan embassy in London, with an ambassador
and staﬀ appointed by the Gaddaﬁ Government, and Libyan Government property and
activity in the UK. There was a UK embassy in Tripoli, with an ambassador and staﬀ
from the British diplomatic service. Although there had been no direct statement by the
British Government that it ‘recognized’ the Gaddaﬁ authorities as ‘the government of
Libya’, the nature of its dealings with them (and the absence of any dealings with
anyone else) left no doubt about the status of the Libyan Government as a matter of UK
law, if the question had arisen. Although there were diﬀerences between the two
Governments, even friction in the odd case, UK-Libyan relations appeared to fall within
the broad notion of normality which prevails in diplomatic life. For instance, one issue
(which will be referred to later14) was that there was in the UK a substantial amount of
Libyan currency, printed for the Libyan Government by a British company, the sort of
mundane matter which indicates a certain degree of conﬁdence between the two
administrations. Arms sales between the two countries appear to have proceeded in
normal ways. The British Government did not endorse every activity of the Libyan
Government, especially in the ﬁeld of human rights,15 but these diﬀerences were
nowhere near serious enough to cast any doubts upon its view of the legitimacy, still less
the legality, of the regime in Tripoli.
C. The conﬂict(s) in Libya
In the immediate aftermath of the start of the bombing campaign by NATO, the British
embassy in Tripoli (along with those of several other States) was destroyed by a mob
attack on 30 April 2011, which the local authorities appeared to do nothing to prevent.
The British ambassador and his staﬀ left Libya and the Libyan ambassador in London
was ordered home.16 The embassy in the UK remained under the authority of a chargé
d’aﬀaires and inter-governmental relations continued. The orthodox nature of these
continuing relations was demonstrated, though in an unusual fashion, when the UK
declared two members of the Libya mission personae non grata by reason of their
activities in London against supporters of the NTC, without this prejudicing the
continuation of the remainder of the staﬀ and the mission itself.17 From the outbreak of
ﬁghting, the Gaddaﬁ Government made clear its intention to resist the rebellion. If
anything the intensity of its actions, certainly the vehemence with which its intentions
14 See below, Section H.
15 See, for example, Human Rights and Democracy: FCO Report 2010: Countries of
Concern – Libya, <http://fcohrdreport.readandcomment.com>.
16 HC Deb 9 May 2011 Vol 527 c989W.
17 Libya described its embassy in London as the ‘Libyan People’s Bureau’ but nothing turned
on the denomination, HC Deb 5 May 2011 Vol 527 c624WS; also HC Deb 20 June Vol 530 c22W.
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were expressed, intensiﬁed after the NATO raids began. While the foreign States
engaged in operations against Libya eschewed regime change as an object of their
campaign and while they maintained inter-governmental relations with the Gaddaﬁ
authorities, their expectation that the Libyan government would be replaced was made
manifest.18 A problem they faced was that the early successes of the rebels in the east
were not repeated and, although the NTC enjoyed authority in large parts of eastern
Libya, its writ hardly extended at all in other parts of the country, especially in Tripoli.
Once upon a time, a British government might have recognized the NTC as the de facto
government in the areas which it controlled; at an even earlier time, the NTC might have
been recognized as insurgents but no decisions like this were forthcoming. It became
clear that the support of the NTC from outside States was based more on its character, it
was perceived as a body committed to democracy (and it was not Gaddaﬁ), than on its
eﬀectiveness. Support was given to the NTC to secure its eﬀective control in Libya, not
because of it, a tactic redolent of the use of recognition of States in the disintegration of
Yugoslavia, for Bosnia-Herzegovina, certainly.19
D. Recognizing governments—British policy
The British policy of not recognizing governments was set out in a parliamentary
answer in 1980. The Foreign Secretary wrote:
. . . we have decided that we shall no longer accord recognition to Governments. . .
Where an unconstitutional change of regime takes place in a recognized State,
Governments of other States must necessarily consider what dealings, if any, they should
have with the new regime and whether and to what extent it qualiﬁes to be treated as the
Government of the State concerned. . .
We shall continue to decide the nature of our dealings with regimes which come to power
unconstitutionally in the light of our assessment of whether they are able of themselves to
exercise eﬀective control of the territory of the State concerned, and seem likely to continue
to do so.20
The policy seems to address a single (and, it should be said, largely uncomplicated)
situation, where a rebel movement completely supersedes an existing eﬀective authority
within a recognized State. It does not in its terms purport to decide what the Government
should do in the period prior to the success of a revolution, and in circumstances such as
this, even recourse to de facto recognition of the rebels in the east might have been
unlikely given the limited territorial scope of their authority and the resistance of the
Government. The new policy allowed for procrastination and ambiguity up to and
beyond the time when, under the previous policy, a recognition decision would have
been required. The 1980 policy has been very largely adhered to.21 It has been reiterated
almost as a matter of course whenever a British Government has been asked for its
18 HC Deb (n 16).
19 See R Rich, ‘Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union’
(1993) 4 EJIL 36.
20 HL Debs 28 April 1980 Vol 408 cs1121–1122.
21 UKMIL 2008, 5/31, (2008) 79 British YBIntlL 617. See S Talmon, ‘Recognition of
Governments: an Analysis of the New British Policy’ (1992) 63 British YBIntlL 231.
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stance on the recognition of this or that foreign Government.22 After 1980 until the
Libyan case, there were no examples of the Government making a statement
recognizing a government in even the most intractable civil war, though forms of
words were often found to indicate clearly where the Government stood. The same
policy was followed in those few occasions when the question of the status of a foreign
authority arose in judicial proceedings in the UK. Once, the British Government would
have issued an executive certiﬁcate saying whether or not a foreign institution had been
recognized as a government by HMG and that certiﬁcate would have been conclusive on
the matter to which its spoke.23 Under the new arrangement, the Government would
present evidence of its dealings with the foreign authority, evidence which carried
powerful weight but which, nonetheless, might be challenged or contradicted by other
evidence brought by a party disobliged by the result which would have followed
from the Government’s uncontested evidence.24 It is for a British court ﬁnally to
determine whether or not the authority is, as a matter of fact, the Government of another
State.
Subject to what will be written shortly, so long as eﬀectiveness or the existence of
inter-governmental relations were, respectively, the basis for recognition decisions or
the identiﬁcation of foreign governments, the British position was assessed against
objective factors without regard to the nature or the conduct of the foreign authority.
With respect to foreign States, British policy has been conducted similarly, save that
reference is now occasionally made to a disqualifying element, sometimes with an
international legal basis,25 sometimes on policy grounds.26 This has resulted in the UK
not recognizing as States entities the objective characteristics of which would otherwise
have resulted in it doing so. There is less evidence27 that the British Government has
adopted what seems to be a developing practice of accepting a less stringent test of
eﬀectiveness when deciding to recognize States where the impact of other international
rules, notably self-determination, points to the inevitability of a particular solution, even
if for the time being to be delayed. Both these factors—the negative and positive ones,
mutatis mutandis, appear to have been at work as the British Government struggled with
its relationships with the Gaddaﬁ government and the emerging NTC in Libya. The
Foreign Secretary restated the ‘no recognition of governments’ policy quite late in the
piece. On 16 May 2011, he said:
We have not given them [the NTC] oﬃcial recognition; we recognise states, not
Governments. We recognise the state of Libya. We say for now—at this moment—that
they [the NTC] are the legitimate representatives, as Gaddaﬁ has lost legitimacy, and we
have invited them to open an oﬃce but not an embassy here in London. . . we have a
diplomatic mission in Benghazi that is working with them daily.28
22 Id 5/32 (Kenya), (2008) 79 British YBIntlL 618 and HC Deb 16 May 2011 Vol 528 c61 with
respect to Libya.
23 E Wilmshurst, ‘Executive Certiﬁcates: the United Kingdom’ (1986) 35 ICLQ 157.
24 Republic of Somalia v Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) SA [1993] QB 54.
25 For instance, the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, see UKMIL 2008 5/41, (2008) 79
British YBIntlL 622 referring to Security Council resolutions 541 and 550.
26 For example, Somaliland, see UKMIL 2009 5/7 and 5/13, (2009) 80 British YBIntlL 710
and 712.
27 But not none at all, for example the recognition of Kosovo, UKMIL 2008 5/16, (2008) 79
British YBIntlL 604. 28 HC Deb 16 May 2011 Vol 528 c61.
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Notwithstanding the ‘loss of legitimacy’ of the Gaddaﬁ regime, the British Government
still dealt with it as a government. The Libyan Embassy in London remained open and
staﬀed by Gaddaﬁ appointees.29
The British embassy in Tripoli had been destroyed by demonstrators on 30 April
2011, a consequence of which was the expulsion of the Libyan ambassador in London.
There was no UK representation in Tripoli and the ‘diplomatic mission’ in Benghazi
was not a replacement embassy—the rather ambiguous term seems to have indicated
only that the oﬃce was staﬀed by diplomats. Similar ambiguity attached to the status of
the NTC. An FCO Minister wrote in a Parliamentary answer:
It is clear that Gaddaﬁ no longer has legitimacy and so he should heed the calls of the Libyan
people and the international community to leave immediately. We recognise the National
Transitional Council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people and welcome their
eﬀorts to include all Libyans and to prepare for a political transition in which Libyans can
decide on their own future (emphasis added).30
The use of ‘recognition’ here is dubious for something less than a government, ‘accept’
or ‘acknowledge’ would have been better. The notion of ‘legitimate representation’
belongs to discourse from the ﬁeld of colonial self-determination rather than eﬀective
administration. The status of the NTC was based on its relatively territorially limited and
fragile control (each of which the British Government were hoping would be corrected).
This, perhaps, indicated that in situations analogous to those which the British
Government would previously have treated as ones of colonial self-determination or
ones like the ad hoc notion of self-determination which was invoked in the
reconﬁguration of Yugoslavia, that less than full usurpation of a government’s authority
by rebels might be enough to allow acceptance or even recognition of degrees of status
up to—and as it was to turn out—including - recognition as a government, this at least
as a matter of British policy. Without the backing of the principle of colonial self-
determination, it is, of course, a policy carrying the risk of challenge against the
standards of international law by an incumbent government as an act of unjustiﬁed
intervention in its State’s internal aﬀairs. Nonetheless, the British Government pressed
on with its policy of engagement with the NTC. On 15 July 2011, the FCO said:
The Contact Group’s31 decision to deal with the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the
legitimate governing authority in Libya, reﬂects the NTC’s increasing legitimacy,
competence and success in reaching out to all Libyans. In contrast, Qadhaﬁ has lost all
legitimacy in the eyes of the Libyan people and the international community.32
E. Recognizing the NTC as the Government of Libya
The dramatic change in UK policy was announced on 28 July 2011. Speaking after a
meeting of the Libya Contact Group, the Foreign Secretary said:
At the latest Libya Contact Group in Istanbul the international community sent an
unequivocal message to Qadhaﬁ: that he had no legitimacy and there was no future for Libya
with him in power. As part of this it decided ‘to deal with the National Transitional Council
29 HC Deb 24 May 2011Vol 528 c586W; HC Deb 20 June 2011 Vol 530 c22W.
30 HC Deb 27 June 2011, Vol 530 c566W.
31 The ‘Libya Contact Group’ was an informal and changing group of States which were
opposed to Gaddaﬁ’s continuing in oﬃce and which supported the cause of the NTC. It met in
various places. 32 <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news> , 15 July 2011.
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(NTC) as the legitimate governing authority in Libya’. This was a signiﬁcant development,
and today I will outline the action that the UK will now take in response.33
The point to note here is that the decision of the Contact Group did not constitute
recognition of the NTC by each of the participant States, nor did the UK individually act
on the assumption that its participation in the decision amounted to recognition of the
NTC. Instead, discrete UK action was required. The Foreign Secretary continued:
The Prime Minister and I have decided that the United Kingdom recognises and will deal
with the National Transitional Council as the sole governmental authority in Libya. This
decision reﬂects the NTC’s increasing legitimacy, competence and success in reaching out to
Libyans across the country. Through its actions the NTC has shown its commitment to a
more open and democratic Libya—something that it is working to achieve through an
inclusive political process. This is in stark contrast to Qadhaﬁ, whose brutality against the
Libyan people has stripped him of all legitimacy.
The NTC is a focal point for people throughout Libya who want a better future for their
country. Our decision also reﬂects the responsibilities that the NTC has taken on in the areas
under its control. It means we will deal with the NTC on the same basis as other
governments around the world.34
These words constitute the revival of the pre-1980 policy of making decisions on the
recognition of governments, although the circumstances which would prompt such a
decision in this case appear to have been quite out of line with those which would have
had to have prevailed before 1980.35 It is to be emphasized that the motivation for the
decision to recognize the NTC as the Government of Libya is explained as its success
‘in reaching out to Libyans across the country’ and ‘its commitment to a more open and
democratic Libya’. The recognition is said to reﬂect ‘the responsibilities that the NTC
has taken on in the areas under its control’. This is much less demanding than a
requirement that the authority has demonstrated eﬀective governmental control over the
State territory with a prospect that its authority will be permanent. Later in the statement,
the Foreign Secretary conﬁrmed that the control of the NTC was far from complete,
when he said:
The momentum has shifted against him and those around him. There is steady progress
across the board, in particular around Misrata, Brega and Jebel Nafusa where the opposition
is driving Qadhaﬁ’s forces back. Reports suggest that morale amongst the regime’s forces is
low. Economic sanctions are restricting his ability to wage war on Qadhaﬁ’s own people.36
However, the Gaddaﬁ forces were far from defeated and the extent of the NTC’s control
did not extend to Tripoli. The Foreign Secretary continued his recognition remarks:
I am making this announcement today to reﬂect the facts on the ground and increase our
support for those ﬁghting and working for a better future in Libya. We will sustain our
actions for as long as is necessary. Our recent decision to deploy an additional four Tornados
to Libya is a concrete illustration of this end.37
This is quite at odds with the insistence that recognition ‘should not depend on whether
the character of the regime is such as to command His Majesty’s Government’s
approval’.38 It took quite some time for the NTC forces to establish complete control in
Libya. As late as 26 September 2011, Libya’s representative told the Security Council:
33 <www.fco.gov.uk/news> , 27 July 2011. 34 ibid.
35 See HC Deb 21 March 1951 Vol 485 cols 2410–2411.
36 FCO news (n 33). 37 ibid. 38 HC Deb (n 35).
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Although some people think that the Al-Qadhaﬁ regime fell with the fall of the capital and
other cities, it is still true that the mission is far from accomplished. Al-Qadhaﬁ’s battalions
continue to kill innocent civilians in three distinct regions of our country—in Sirte, in Bani
Walid and yesterday in Ghadamis—and therefore the very foundations of resolution 1973
(2011) remain valid. In that regard, we would like to thank NATO for its decision to extend
its mission for an additional 90 days.
Secondly, Al-Qadhaﬁ is still at large and possesses huge amounts of money and gold.
The simple fact that he is still free and that he has such wealth at his disposal means that he is
still capable of destabilizing the situation, not only within my country but also in the Sahel
region and the African desert. It is no exaggeration to say that even beyond the African
continent, Al-Qadhaﬁ, with the means and assets has available to him, could resume his
terrorist practices by distributing arms across the continent in order to justify his prediction
that his absence from the political stage would be synonymous with the expansion of
Al-Qaida and extremism throughout Africa.39
The Foreign Secretary then explained what some of the consequences of the decision
were:
In line with this decision we therefore summoned the Libyan Charge d’Aﬀaires here to the
FCO this morning and informed him that he and other regime diplomats from the Qadhaﬁ
regime must leave the UK.40 We no longer recognise them as the representatives of the
Libyan Government, and are inviting the NTC to appoint a new Libyan diplomatic envoy to
take over the Libyan Embassy in London.41
In line with UNSCRs 1970 & 1973, the UK has continued to explore how to unfreeze assets
to support the NTC. At the request of the Arabian Gulf Oil Company [AGOCO], a Libyan
oil company, the UK is ready to make available £91 million of the Company’s assets in the
UK.
AGOCO is operating under the control of the NTC and we are assured that its activities will
not beneﬁt any listed entity under the sanctions. We will issue licences for the use of its
frozen funds to meet its basic needs. This will help to ensure that the crucial provision of fuel
is maintained. We will work hard with our international partners in the coming weeks to
unfreeze further Libyan assets frozen in the UK for the beneﬁt of the Libyan people,
including stocks of Libyan currency and other assets of the Libyan Central Bank, in line with
UNSCRs 1970 and 1973. We are also discussing with partners what funds we can make
available for the beneﬁt of the Libyan people to alleviate the hardships they face. . .42
The Foreign Secretary referred speciﬁcally to the ﬁnancial diﬃculties of Libyan
students in the UK who depended upon payments from accounts operated by the Libyan
mission in London, a matter which was soon to reach the courts.43
From the domestic perspective, it is worth underlining that this statement is the
revival of an apparently discarded policy for recognizing governments abandoned in
1980 but that, in its resuscitated form, the circumstances which will apparently trigger a
‘recognition of government’ decision are greatly changed from those which previously
prevailed.
Among the consequences of an authority being recognized by the British
Government as the government of a foreign State is that the authority becomes entitled
to State property in the UK. This includes the Embassy and associated diplomatic
premises but, importantly, includes bank accounts to the credit of the foreign State and
39 Security Council, S/PV.6622, p 6.
40 The ambassador had been expelled earlier, (n 16).
41 The new ambassador appointed by the NTC was received on 10 August 2011.
42 FCO news (n 33). 43 See below, Section H.
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government and its instrumentalities. In the present case of Libya, there was a
signiﬁcant complication aﬀecting ﬁnancial assets belonging to the State because of the
sanctions which had been imposed by the Security Council on Libya at the beginning of
the uprising against the Gaddaﬁ government. As part of Security Council resolution
1970 (which is a Chapter VII resolution), the Council decided that States should freeze
funds owned or controlled by certain named individuals or entities from Libya, with the
power of the Sanctions Committee set up under the resolution to designate further
persons and institutions for the same treatment, an obligation reinforced by resolution
1973.44 The combined eﬀect was very wide reaching, touching all ﬁnancial resources
‘owned or controlled, directly or indirectly by the Libyan authorities’. Although there
might have been an argument that the resources of the ‘old’ Libyan authorities were now
owned and controlled by the ‘new’ Libyan authorities, the line taken was that the asset
freezing obligations persisted, even as Gaddaﬁ’s territorial control diminished and the
authority of the NTC was acknowledged by an increasing number of States. In this
connection, the Foreign Secretary was asked in Parliament in June 2011:
Given that the Foreign Secretary had said that the NTC represented the legitimate aspirations
of the Libyan people, he was asked if he believed that the $53 billion-worth of frozen Libyan
assets, including the $182 million-worth allegedly held by the Royal Bank of Scotland,
would be released to the NTC for it to dispose of as it wished.
He said:
It is not possible to release those assets under the current UN resolutions—of course we have
looked at this matter, but all the advice that we have been given is that it is not possible to do
that. Other countries have received the same advice and, certainly, all other European
countries are in the same position. It is very important that we stay within the UN resolutions
and retain the moral authority of operating within international law, even though that is
inconvenient in some respects and requires us to do some things diﬀerently from how we
might wish. So that is a higher priority than ﬁnding a way around the UN resolutions. If it is
possible to change them at any stage, we would be ready to do so.45
As events developed in Libya, the situation about Libyan property changed. On 31
August 2011, the Royal Air Force delivered 280 million dinars (c£140 m) to the Central
Bank of Libya in Benghazi. The newly minted banknotes were part of a stock of 1.86bn
dinars printed in the UK, which had been frozen under Security Council resolution 1970
at the start of the crisis in Libya in order to prevent them falling into the hands of the
Gaddaﬁ Government. They were unfrozen by an unpublished decision of the Sanctions
Committee on Monday 29 August 2011.
Following the delivery of the cash, the Foreign Secretary said:
I am delighted to announce that today the RAF delivered 280 m Libyan dinars to the Central
Bank of Libya in Benghazi. The banknotes will be used to pay the wages of Libyan public
sector employees, including nurses, doctors, teachers and police oﬃcers; provide support for
those on social security who have not been paid for a number of months; provide aid for
refugees displaced by the conﬂict; pay for medicines and subsidies for food supplies; and
will be transferred to commercial banks in order to make currency available to the general
public for their basic living expenses. This is particularly important at the time of Eid.
Returning money to the Libyan people is part of our commitment to help the NTC rebuild
Libya and help create a country where the legitimate needs and aspirations of the Libyan
44 See UK note (n 8). 45 HC Debs June 2011 Vol 529 c47.
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people can be met. It follows and was authorised by the UN’s decision to unfreeze 1.86bn
Libyan dinar banknotes printed in the UK. Further deliveries of the remaining funds will be
made shortly.46
More substantial progress on releasing Libyan assets was delayed until 16 September
2011 when the Security Council approved resolution 2009. By this date, the NTC had
been recognized by a large number of States and the credentials of its representative
approved by the General Assembly credentials committee.47 Also, progress was being
made on the ground in defeating the ﬁghters who remained loyal to Gaddaﬁ. Tripoli was
declared secure on 9 September 201148 and leaders of the NTC appeared in Tripoli, to
be followed by a visit there from the leaders of the NATO States which had headed the
aerial action against the Gaddaﬁ forces on 15 September 2011. Of political importance
in the course of events was the recognition by the African Union of the NTC as the
‘de facto’. Government of Libya. Some African States had been among the most critical
of the strategy of the air campaign and the most protective of the status of the Gaddaﬁ
Government.49
F. Is the recognition of the NTC the revival of the pre-1980 policy of
recognizing governments?
When, in 1980, the Foreign Secretary announced the new policy of not recognizing
governments, the change of policy was not prompted by considerations of international
law but by the government’s assessment that the existing policy was seen as conferring
a mark of political approval on the recognized entity and that the coordination of
decisions on the status of foreign authorities with the UK’s allies was made diﬃcult
because of the automatic way in which recognition of governments had been practised
by British Governments in the past. The new policy allowed a nuanced and pragmatic
response to events in a foreign State and replaced the practically instant recognition of a
rebel regime as soon as it had obtained eﬀective control in its State. The previous policy
was the exercise of a prerogative power of the government, a power which could be
implemented in domestic law by the issuing of an executive certiﬁcate, explaining the
use of the power in a particular case, which the courts regarded as conclusive as to the
facts to which the certiﬁcate attested, including the crucial fact the British Government
recognized (or did not recognize) authority Y as the government of State Z. There were,
thus, two kinds of fact relevant to a decision to recognize a government—ﬁrst, the fact
of eﬀective control, which prompted the second, the decision to recognize. It should be
noted that recognition was, as a matter of international law, a qualiﬁed discretion of
States—there was no duty to recognize a foreign authority, no matter how strong its own
domestic position. However, British practice was such that it would have constituted a
faithful execution of any duty, had one existed. That would not have been true about the
policies of most other States.50
46 <http://www.fco.gov/uk/news> , 31 August 2011.
47 General Assembly resolution A/66/3.
48 A British diplomatic mission had been ‘re-established’ in Tripoli on 5 September 2011,
<www.fco.gov.uk/news> , 5 September 2011.
49 < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14986442.> .
50 See in general, M Peterson, Recognition of Governments. Legal Doctrine and State Practice,
1815–1995 (Macmillan 1997).
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Quite apart from the international ramiﬁcations of any recognition decision, it had
signiﬁcant consequences in domestic law. As a matter of English51 law, a recognized
government would be entitled to have its status respected and protected in English law,
for instance to be able to control State property in the UK and to use the English courts
to protect its rights. It would be entitled to immunity for itself and its diplomatic
representatives. Its acts and decrees would be recognized and applied, subject to the
rules of the English conﬂict of laws, to actions involving individuals to which the
foreign laws were germane.52 The policy on the recognition of governments was given a
gloss to meet the circumstances where there was more there one authority exercising
authority in a State, occasionally, even where one of the competing entities had been
totally expelled from its territory. This was the situation where a rebel group achieved
some success in its ambitions to overthrow the prevailing regime (which, as far as
the UK were concerned) would usually have been the government then recognized as
the de facto government of the State by the British Government. Where an authority had
established its governmental control over the whole of its territory with the prospect of
permanence to this state of aﬀairs, the UK decision was described as ‘recognition
de iure’. A government so recognized, enjoyed all the privileges and powers, domestic
and external, available to the government of that State. It continued to beneﬁt from this
position, even in the face of internal disorder up to the point where the rebels exercised
actual authority in the State. If the rebels established an eﬀective regime, they might be
‘recognized de facto’, which gave them a limited status in UK law.53 In the meantime,
the authority of the de iure government would prevail in its area of control and it would
be entitled to exercise the extra-territorial powers of the State, for example, with respect
to property in England.54 If and when the rebels consolidated their control to such an
extent that the previous government lost all authority, in general, they would be
recognized de iure. A doctrine of the retrospective eﬀect of recognition resulted in the
acceptance of the validity of acts of the rebels from the time which they had ﬁrst
exercised government authority in fact55 (but which did not serve to invalidate the
otherwise legitimate activities of the displaced government).56
Before 1980, the way in which the decisions to recognize governments were taken by
the British Government and the facility of securing conclusive eﬀect of those decisions
in domestic law provided a considerable degree of certainty to the legal position
following changes of government, especially important in commercial matters. After the
change of practice in 1980, few problems have arisen but the absence of the executive
certiﬁcate conclusively certifying to the fact of recognition has shifted decision-making
away from government to the courts. The evidential inquiries the courts are required to
make are more complicated, the outcomes less certain, than they were previously.
51 When one looks at the domestic consequences of recognition decisions (which is a United
Kingdom matter) for judicial proceedings, they will be determined by the legal system in which the
litigation proceeds. It is a matter of convenience to use ‘English’ as the example.
52 M Shaw, International Law (6th ed, CUP 2008) 472–482; DPO’Connell, International Law
(2nd ed, Stevens 1970) 167–172. 53 The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] AC 256.
54 Haile Selassie v Cable and Wireless (No 2) [1939] 1 Ch 182.
55 Gdynia Amerkya Linie v Boguslawski [1953] AC 11.
56 Civil Air Transport v Central Air Transport [1953] AC 70.
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G. Recognition, ‘de-recognition’, withdrawal of recognition
When a government was recognized de iure or when governmental relations with an
authority in another State were conducted exclusively with a particular regime, the
previous authority lost its status. It would be unusual for there to be a speciﬁc
‘de-recognizing’ statement to accompany this process. It would also be unusual for
‘de-recognition’ to occur other than where a new authority had established itself
eﬀectively within a State—eﬀectiveness of a government would ordinarily only be lost
by actions which established the control of an alternative authority. As has been
explained, other things being equal, the UK would recognize or establish relations with
the new powers as a matter of course. It is possible to envisage situations which do not
ﬁt this factual paradigm exactly: the departure of the Siad Barre Government from
power and from Somalia in 1991 left behind several contestants for power, none of
which were able to establish a prospect of permanent control, even over quite conﬁned
areas. There was no government to be recognized or with which to establish relations.
However, from, say, about 1970, another factor has been added to those relevant to a
recognition decision. It is the claim that a displacing authority, even if eﬀective, is
tainted by some international illegality, which allows or even requires it not to be
recognized, whatever degree of control it exerts within the territory. The most prominent
instances have concerned claims to statehood, where the issue of actual governmental
eﬀectiveness has been merely one of the issues of concern: it is the way in which
eﬀectiveness were achieved which might raise matters of its international legality.
Foreign intervention, especially, open, troop assistance to the rebels, does suggest that
the intervention is unlawful and that foreign States are obliged not to recognize the
consequences of this serious illegality, which includes not recognizing any authority
established as a result of the illegal action. The one instance where British policy was
inﬂuenced by these considerations was its decision in 1979 to withdraw recognition
from the defeated government of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia but not to recognize
the eﬀective new authority of Heng Samrin because he had attained power only as a
result of the armed support of forces from Viet Nam. In some instances, any obligation
arising under general international law will have been supplemented or made more
explicit by a decision of the Security Council, binding States not to recognize or have
diplomatic relations with the illegally installed government. However, recent
developments have rather turned these considerations on their head. Attention has
shifted to the nature and activities of an established government, in some instances, the
case being made that a government has lost its legitimacy, maybe even its legality, by
reason of its atrocious conduct in oﬃce. That is to say that its authority comes into
question precisely because of its eﬀective but excessive control, rather than because
such control is ebbing away. Where this is the case, other States might wish to foster the
eﬀorts of forces within the State, which potentially would form a new government
untainted by the misdoings of the existing one. What the foreign States want is the
overthrow of the ‘illegitimate’ regime by the rebels and they use recognition to try to
help that process come about by conferring on the rebels the advantages which
recognition brings. Clearly, there are international legal considerations here which are
beyond the scope of the present discussion but their problematic quality may be reduced
where there is Security Council authorization for action against the incumbent and in
favour of the rebels. The enduring theme of British recognition policy that it does not
depend upon the nature of either of the contending factions for governmental status does
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not square readily with this new circumstance. Before I speculate about its
consequences, I shall look at a case which reached the High Court with extraordinary
speed as the events unfolded in Libya.
H. British Arab Commercial Bank v National Transitional Council of
the State of Libya57
On 19 August 2011, less than a month after the decision to recognize the NTC, the High
Court was asked to adjudicate on the nature and eﬀects of that decision. The urgency
was brought about by the need of the Bank for certainty about who might authorize
payments from an account it held to fund Libyan students studying in the UK. The funds
had been deposited by the Gaddaﬁ regime and its diplomatic representatives held
mandates authorizing withdrawals from the account. The Bank sought a declaration that
it was now entitled to make payments on the authority of the representative of the NTC,
lately accredited to the British government after the recognition decision. The British
Government was represented in the proceedings but the Gaddaﬁ regime was not, its
legal representative being unable to obtain instructions and the court being unwilling to
adjourn to enable him to do so.
There had been conversations between the Bank and the British Government from
early in May about dealings with the Libyan accounts at the Bank. The Bank was told
that it could accept instructions from the head of the (Gaddaﬁ) mission in London in
early May 2011 but the Bank was concerned when it became acquainted with the
prospect of recognition of the NTC by the British Government. After the recognition
decision, the Libyan embassy told the Bank not to aﬀect withdrawals from most of its
accounts and that provision was being made for the accounts to be administered by the
Libyan Foreign Ministry in the near future. The account for paying student stipends was
not one of those frozen by the Libyan embassy but the Bank would not act on an
instruction from it to make the regular payments at the end of July.
The ﬁrst statement by the British Government to the Bank after recognition of
the NTC, issued on 8 August 2011 at the request of the Bank, contained elements of
both the revived recognition policy and the established ‘not recognizing’ practice,
attesting to both the act of recognition and the practice of inter-governmental dealings.
It said:
I can conﬁrm that, as announced by the Foreign Secretary on 27 July, the UK recognises and
is now dealing with the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the sole governmental
authority in Libya. We therefore no longer have diplomatic relations with the Qadhaﬁ
regime, nor do we accept that they have the authority to accredit diplomatic representatives
of Libya to the UK. On 4 August 2011 the Government accepted the nomination of
Mr Mahmud Nacua as the Libyan Chargé d’Aﬀaires ad interim, and will accredit him
accordingly.58
After the Libyan Foreign Bank, the majority shareholder in the British Arab Bank and
still controlled by Gaddaﬁ representatives, had written to the Bank asking it to freeze the
disputed accounts, the FCO wrote again on 12 August 2011:
Further, the Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce can conﬁrm that Mr Mahmud Nacua is at
liberty to assign roles within the mission as he sees ﬁt. As Chargé, he has oversight of the
57 [2011] EWHC 2274 (Comm). 58 ibid para 10.
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Embassy and Cultural Aﬀairs section, and the FCO has no objection to British Arab
Commercial Bank Plc accepting instructions from him on behalf of the mission.
HMG considers the sole legitimate governing authority of Libya to be the National
Transitional Council of Libya, and not the illegitimate Qadhaﬁ regime. HMG considers that
only the legitimate governing authority of Libya or persons so authorised by that authority
are entitled to give instructions in relation to the Libyan Embassy’s bank account in the
UK.59
This adds the element of ‘de-recognition’ or the abandonment of inter-governmental
relations between the UK and Gaddaﬁ authorities—the conclusion being that there was
no residual or parallel authority in the old regime, either in Libya or to exercise any
external authority of the State. The letter speaks to legal consequences of the British
government action, on which the FCO might have an opinion but, unlike the act of
recognition, its statement would not be conclusive in legal proceedings. Because the
NTC were recognized as the governing authority of Libya, it would have been entitled
to immunities under the State Immunity Act 1978, but its legal representatives were
instructed to accept service from the Bank and no issue of immunity was raised.
The Bank began proceedings against the NTC on 19 August 2011, seeking a
declaration that it was entitled to act on the instructions of the NTC mission in London,
being concerned particularly about the position of the Libyan students who depended
upon payments from the Bank. The Bank asked the court to seek a certiﬁcate from the
FCO addressing the status of the NTC. In the absence of a certiﬁcate, the Bank argued
that the court should investigate the factual position, which, Blair J said:
. . . would have involved consideration of issues such as whether the NTC is the
constitutional government of Libya, the degree, nature and stability of administrative
control that it of itself exercises over the territory of the state, whether HMG has any dealings
with it and, if so, what is the nature of those dealings, and the extent of international
recognition that it has as the government of the state. . . That might be a diﬃcult exercise
given the conditions that appear to prevail in Libya at the time of this judgment (26 August
2011).60
This raises the most interesting aspect of the UK recognition decision in July. If a
certiﬁcate were issued (as it was), it might have been the case (as it was) that the court
would have regarded it as conclusive on the matter of which authority was the
government of Libya for the purposes of English law. This would have been (and was)
the revival of the pre-1980 statement practice and the attendant law: the matter would
eﬀectively have been decided by the executive. After the 1980 statement, a new judicial
practice emerged (as it had to) of the court itself undertaking an investigation to see if a
claimant authority really was the government of a foreign State. The relevant evidence
and the purposes for which it was required were set out with some skill by Hobhouse J
(as he then was) in Republic of Somalia v Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) SA.61 As
Blair J acknowledged, the evidential inquiry would be very diﬃcult, given the
conditions in Libya at the time of the hearing, a conclusion which might tempt one to
think that the security of any control exercised by either claimant to governmental status
in Libya was rather precarious, hardly indicative of ‘government in fact’. Of course, the
evidence from the British government about the nature of its dealings with the two
59 ibid para 14. NTC oﬃcials began to work from the Libyan embassy in London from 9
August 2011. 60 ibid para 22.
61 [1993] QB 54; also Sierra Leone Telecommunications v Barclays Bank [1998] 2 All ER 821.
260 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 10 Jul 2014 IP address: 147.188.224.221
claimants would have carried considerable weight, as Hobhouse J had acknowledged it
would have in Republic of Somalia. But the signiﬁcant point is that the decision would
have been for the court and not exclusively for the executive, which clearly had a view
about the desirability of one outcome compared with the other.
By the time of his judgment, Blair J had been provided with a terse certiﬁcate from
the FCO. It said:
CERTIFICATE
In the matter of
British Arab Commercial Bank Plc v. The National Transitional Council of the State of Libya
I, the Rt. Hon. William Hague MP, Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Aﬀairs, refer to the above proceedings and issue the following certiﬁcate:
(1) Her Majesty’s Government recognise the National Transitional Council as the
Government of Libya.
(2) Her Majesty’s Government do not recognise any other Government in Libya. In
particular, they no longer recognise the former Qadhaﬁ regime as the Government of any
part of Libya.62
The certiﬁcate is in proper form, referring only to facts peculiarly within the
Government’s knowledge on matters falling within its competence. It speaks to
recognition and to ‘de-recognition’. The act of recognition enabled Blair J to distinguish
Republic of Somalia and the certiﬁcate allowed him to avoid a potentially awkward
factual inquiry. He said:
. . . the important point is that the government of the United Kingdom recognises it
[the NTC] as the legitimate government of Libya.63
The FCO certiﬁcate ‘is conclusive’ as to whether the NTC is the Government of Libya,
because, the judge went on, ‘in the ﬁeld of foreign aﬀairs, the Crown in its executive and
judicial functions speak[s] with one voice’.64 This is familiar language but it is worth
emphasizing that it aﬀects only the matter of recognition. What matters is that Blair J
then applied the old common law rule that recognition would determine who was the
government and who was to be recognized as that government’s representative in the
UK for the purposes of English law. Because he regarded the matter as clear, the judge
accepted as the UK’s position the letter of 4 August, quoted above, but that letter was
not a certiﬁcate and was not otherwise conclusive—it was the evidence which
established the authority of the charge d’aﬀaires. As a matter of principle, he said, the
charge d’aﬀaires could give instructions to the Bank about accounts in the name of the
Libyan embassy in London, though the formalities were for the Bank to establish and
satisfy itself. The judge ordered the declaration, although its precise terms were not
revealed.
It is worth asking why the Bank made so much of this matter, given the recognition
statement of 28 July 2011. The reason surely is because the factual circumstances in
62 British Arab Bank (n 57). 63 ibid para 24.
64 The judgment refers to Gur Corporation v Trust Bank of Africa [1987] 1 QB 599, para 604,
per Steyn, J; The Arantzazu Mendi (n 53) p 264, per Lord Atkin; and Sultan of Pahang, R (on the
application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCACiv 616, paras 14 and
30, per Maurice Kay and Moore-Bick LLJ.
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Libya did not accord fully with the British decision. The Gaddaﬁ Government, as it then
was, had made clear its resolve to ﬁght oﬀ the rebellion and was resisting rebel advances
in many parts of the country, including Tripoli itself. It could not be known for certain
what view the courts would take of the reincarnation of the ‘recognizing governments
power’: was it lawful? what were its eﬀects? For if the courts had had doubts about the
answers to these questions, the Republic of Somalia judgment would have been
relevant. It would have been a bold prediction to say with the certainty that commercial
relations demand that the outcome of a Republic of Somalia inquiry would have
accorded exactly with the terms of the Foreign Oﬃce certiﬁcate, especially as to the
exercise of extraterritorial prerogatives of the State. The Bank faced the problem under
the ‘not recognizing governments’ policy (which remained in place at the time of its ﬁrst
concern) that it might be concluded that there were no longer intergovernmental
dealings between the UK and the Gaddaﬁ regime but, at the same time, intergovern-
mental relations had not been established with the NTC: there would have been no-one
with authority to sign the cheques. From an academic point of view (and perhaps from
the point of view of future practice), it is a matter for regret, though entirely
understandable, that the position of the Gaddaﬁ authorities was not put forcefully to the
court.
I. Recognition and legality
At the time of the British recognition decision, the Libyan Government declared that it
was illegal and that the government would seek redress in whichever court it could ﬁnd
with jurisdiction over the matter, international or domestic.65 It is hard to imagine that
there could have been an international jurisdiction in which the question could have
been raised. However, it was only the failure to obtain instructions which pre-empted
the representation of Libya in the British Arab Commercial Bank case. What might it
have argued if it had been able to communicate with its lawyer?
The ﬁrst argument might have been that the recognition was unlawful under
international law as an interference in the internal aﬀairs of Libya—the Libyan
Government was ﬁghting to preserve its authority against an unlawful uprising and
other States had a duty to keep out of the conﬂict. Once upon a time, this claim would
have been good in international law and it might still be. The question is whether it
would have any purchase in a case in the UK. Years (and years) ago, I argued that
executive certiﬁcates should be reviewable to see if the government decision to which
the certiﬁcate testiﬁed was compatible with the United Kingdom’s international
obligations.66 The assertion had little impact then and there has not been much since to
encourage me that the courts would modify the deferential position they take with
respect to executive certiﬁcates. A Libyan claim on this ground, even if sustained
against the standards of international law, would have been very unlikely to have helped
the Libyan cause before an English court. It is, though, an act of governmental policy
about which Libya (or a disappointed private litigant in other circumstances) would
have been challenging. Other things being equal, the basic principles of public law
65 See D Akande, ‘Can Libya sue the UK on Recognition of the National Transitional
Council?’ <www.ejiltalk.org>, 30 July 2011.
66 C Warbrick, ‘Executive Certiﬁcates in Foreign Aﬀairs: Prospects for Review and Control’
(1986) 35 ICLQ 138.
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should apply. Given the frequency and vehemence with which the British Government
had reiterated its ‘not recognizing foreign governments’ policy (even in the present
situation), might any applicant not have had a legitimate expectation that the policy
would have been adhered to? If the Government wanted to revert to the old recognition
policy, then notice ought to have been given. This would have been particularly
pertinent to any events occurring before the recognition decision, when anyone dealing
with the Libyan authorities might well have reached the conclusion that the Gaddaﬁ
regime remained the ‘government’ of Libya. Such persons ought not to have been
disadvantaged by any application of the retrospective eﬀects of recognition. More
importantly and central to an orthodox legitimate expectations claim, the procedure for
determining who was the government of Libya under the declared prevalent policy
would have been the courts; under the revived ‘recognition of governments’ policy, it
was the executive. It deserves underlining that at the time the British Government
recognized the NTC, it was by no means clear that it had the reach of eﬀective territorial
control which would have entitled it to be so regarded. It was its democratic aspirations
which motivated the British Government, not the totality of its military success. On the
other hand, the British Government might have had an eﬀective response to this claim,
even if it were otherwise made out. It is this. The power to recognize governments is an
aspect of the prerogative to conduct foreign aﬀairs. Since even legislative action in the
same ﬁeld as an admitted prerogative power does not necessarily replace completely the
prerogative power,67 neither can the mere adoption of an alternative policy by a
government (as the 1980 statement was). The recognition power remained in being,
available, not to resuscitation, but simply to use if a government found it expedient to do
so. This argument was not needed but the tenor of Blair J’s judgment makes it pretty
clear that he would have acceded to it—he expresses no doubt about the lawfulness of
the recognition decision nor of its consequences in domestic law. The orthodoxies of the
‘one voice’ doctrine would probably have persuaded him.
J. Conclusion
As it was, at one level, the judgment might seem all very obvious and very satisfactory,
particularly from the point of view of the British Government and the NTC. Apart from
the issue in the case, the judgment did lay the ground for the British government to take
steps to secure the unfreezing of certain Libyan funds aﬀected by Security Council
sanctions measures, funds which were released to the NTC and which helped in the
consolidation of its exercise of authority in Libya. It is ironic that the policy of British
governments over the years that recognition decisions were to reﬂect the actual situation
in foreign States and not to indicate approval for the character of any authority, a policy
imperative which played its part in refashioning the means by which the policy was
pursued after 1980, has been so casually but instrumentally abandoned. We must wait to
see whether the incident of Libya and NTC turns out to be an anomalous revival of an
abandoned option or whether the attractiveness of the peremptory character of the
recognition decision will appeal to future British Governments with the precise object of
inﬂuencing events in other States.68 If it does become an active tool of foreign policy,
67 R v Home Secretary ex p Northumbria Police Authority [1988] I All ER 556.
68 Announcing a meeting between the Foreign Secretary and representatives of the Syrian
opposition to be held on 21 November 2011, FCO oﬃcials made it clear that this did not signal that
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rather than a reactive one, Parliament might want to consider whether or not it should
have a say on how the policy works.
Postscript
Although not strictly germane to the thrust of this note (which was completed in mid-
November 2011), it is perhaps worth bringing the remainder of the story up-to date. The
NTC declared the conﬂict in Libya over on 23 October 2011 with the fall of Sirte. In the
course of its ﬁnal stages, Gaddaﬁ was captured and killed in the custody of rebel forces.
The interim leader of the NTC resigned and an NTC ‘government’ took over in Tripoli.
The Foreign Secretary opened a new British embassy in Tripoli on 17 October 2011.
Following Security Council resolution 2016 which withdrew the authorization to use
force in Libya, NATO concluded its operations on 31 October 2011.69 A Prime Minister
of the interim Libyan government was elected on 31 October 2011 but a transitional
administration (one of the tasks of which was to prepare for elections for a new
government) had not been appointed by mid-November.
COLIN WARBRICK*
II. THE PALMER REPORT AND THE LEGALITY OF ISRAEL’S
NAVAL BLOCKADE OF GAZA
A. Introduction
On 3 January 2009 Israel deployed a naval blockade against Gaza in order to prevent
materials entering or leaving Gaza that could be used by Hamas in its ongoing armed
conﬂict with Israel.1 With the humanitarian crisis in Gaza worsening, on 31 May 2010 a
ﬂotilla of vessels carrying humanitarian aid expressed its intention to violate the naval
blockade and deliver the aid to Gaza. Before violating the blockade and whilst still on
the high seas, Israel sought to enforce its blockade and capture the vessels. This
occurred largely without incident except in relation to the Mavi Marmara (a vessel
sailing under the ﬂag of the Comoros), which resisted capture by the Israeli special
forces and continued to sail in the direction of Gaza. As Israel special forces boarded the
Mavi violence ensued, with nine crew members of the Mavi being killed and dozens of
others injured (principally Turkish nationals). Several members of Israel’s special forces
they were being recognised as a government, a step made necessary by what had happened with
the NTC, The Independent, 19 November 2011, p 1; see also <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news> , 21
November 2011. If this is the start of a revival of the old policy, it is something of a vindication for
M Peterson, ‘Recognition of Governments should not be Abolished’ (1983) 77 AJIL 31.
69 There is considerable background information on British activities with respect to Libya
from February to October 2011 at <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/mena/libya/website> .
* Birmingham Law School.
1 Number 1/2009 Blockade of the Gaza Strip 3 January 2009, publicized by the Israeli
government at <http://en.mot.gov.il/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=124:
no12009&catid=17:noticetomariners&Itemid=12> .
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